Changes in the regulatory environment in China since 2002 with respect to related-party disclosure were a sign that China wished to make its corporate sector more transparent and accountable. It was expected that the introduction of mandatory disclosure might also lead to higher levels of voluntary disclosure than had previously been the case. Our investigation of a large sample of listed Chinese companies finds that a significant increase in the extent of related-party disclosure occurred after the introduction of The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (The Code). This suggests that The Code issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission have worked as 'soft' corporate directives as well as insisting on legally enforceable mandatory disclosure requirements, to effectively improve the extent of corporate disclosure in the sensitive area of related-party transactions.
Introduction
China is in transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy with a major aim being to introduce efficiency into its economy and to establish a business partnership with the world. Since its economic reforms in the 1980s China has emerged as one of the economic giants in the world. The pace of economic growth has averaged 10 per cent over the past two decades and this trend is expected to continue for some time. China continues to adopt an open-door policy for the international investment community and to assure its trading partners that appropriate steps will be taken to develop and foster business institutions.
In China financial market development and reform started as a by-product of state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform. Its financial market development and corporate governance became entwined with the establishment of the Chinese stock market in the 1990s. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) were launched in 1990 and 1992, respectively. The appearance of the stock markets was a novelty for the Chinese people. Subsequently, agency problems have arisen, generating conflicts of interest between the management and shareholders of listed firms, and have emerged in relation to ownership structure and corporate governance in China. These problems include evidence of opaqueness in related-party transactions. A major source of agency conflict may arise from transactions and relationships entered into by directors and top management with parties that are, or are deemed to be, related to the reporting entity. The two parties are defined as being related if there exists a direct or indirect control or significant influence of one party over the other party in making financial and operating decisions. Significant influence can be exercised over a reporting entity by representation on its board of directors, participation in its policy-making process, material inter-company transactions, interchange of key management personnel, and statute or other agreement.
According to International Accounting Standard (IAS) 24, related-parties can be classified into three categories: corporate shareholders (e.g., subsidiaries, joint ventures and associated companies), individual shareholders (e.g., a major shareholder, close members of the families of these major shareholders, companies owned by major shareholders or their close family members), and key management personnel (e.g., directors and top managers, close family members of these individuals, enterprises owned by these individuals and their close family members). Related-party disclosures are expected to include a description of the company's relationship with each related party and a description of various transactions with them, including the pricing policy and amount involved in purchases, sales, rendering of services, write-offs, guarantees, management contracts, leases and license agreements.
Stakeholders cannot evaluate the quality of corporate governance undertaken by a company unless management chooses to disclose relevant information. Therefore, an improved understanding of incentives for management to provide more rather than less disclosure is important to both regulators and investors. In the area of corporate financial reporting it is important to understand what motivates managers to voluntarily disclose corporate information to external shareholders. Such an understanding will lead to policy implications regarding the formulation and subsequent refinement of accounting standards and codes of corporate governance.
The objective of this study is to identify the extent to which listed companies in China disclose information about their relationships, and their direct and indirect transactions, with their subsidiaries, directors, key management personnel and shareholders, and to assess whether such related-party disclosures have significantly increased in the period following the introduction of The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (The Code) in 2002. Such an analysis can indicate whether The Code, issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as a directive, has been an effective means of increasing the comprehensiveness of corporate disclosure in a culture known for its secrecy (Hofstede, 1984) , and in a disclosure area that is highly sensitive for corporate directors, top management and large shareholders.
The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of institutional background on China's corporate governance framework. Section 3 outlines the literature and establishes the hypothesis. We describe the research methodology Section 4. Results of the analysis and their discussion are presented in Section 5. Section 6 provides a brief conclusion to the paper.
Institutional Background
The rapid development of China's securities markets inevitably demands the establishment of centralised market regulatory bodies. In particular, the scandals in 1992, 1995, and late 1996 to early 1997 involving poor regulation by local government officials destabilised the securities market and undermined the broader financial system. As a result, the Central Government actively enhanced its control and supervision. In late 1992, the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC) and its executive organ, the CSRC, were established. The SCSC, chaired by former Premier Zhu Rongji, is the macro policymaking body of the Chinese securities industry. The CSRC, headed by Zhou Zhengqing, is the SCSC's executive branch responsible for conducting daily supervision and regulation of the securities markets in accordance with the law. Practically, the SCSC and the CSRC took over most of the functions of the former regulatory body. 
Literature and Hypothesis
In Chinese companies, majority shareholders are typically very strong and individual minority shareholders are extremely weak and unable to counter the influence of the majority shareholders. Related-party transactions between controlling shareholders are often detrimental to minority shareholders, who are often regarded as speculators expecting to gain a ‗free ride' on the firm's performance (Lin, 2004) . Thus, China's corporate governance is potentially relatively ineffective in the matter of protecting minority shareholders' rights (Cha, 2001; Lin, 2001; Schipani and Liu, 2001; Tam, 2002; Shan and Taylor, 2008) .
One important aspect of protecting minority shareholders' rights is to disclose more information about related-party relationships and transactions (Shan and Taylor, 2008) . While good board governance would expect both the corporate board and supervisory board to strongly monitor and support related-party disclosures by the company, such disclosures can be sensitive to those board members who directly or indirectly enter business transactions and relationships with the company.
Lin (2004) argues that The Company Law, The Securities Law and The Criminal Law are inclined to neglect civil liability and compensation, and have not provided a procedure and specific clauses for enforceable civil actions. In addition, there is no provision for a class action lawsuit under Chinese law and it is very cumbersome for an individual shareholder to sue for fraud of listed companies (Liu and Ren, 2003) . Under this situation, it is no surprise that a series of corporate scandals were exposed in 2001. These scandals have helped fuel the drive for corporate governance reforms and led to the formulation of The Code became effective in January 2002.
The Code states three requirements for relatedparty transactions. First, written agreements shall be entered into for related-party transactions between a listed company and its connected parties. Such agreements shall observe principles of equality, voluntariness and fair value of compensation. Second, efficient measures shall be adopted by a listed company to prevent its connected parties from interfering with the operation of the firm and damaging the firm's interests by monopolising purchase or sales channels. Therefore, the company shall fully disclose the basis for pricing for relatedparty transactions.
Third, the firm shall adopt efficient measures to prevent its shareholders and their affiliates from misappropriating or transferring the capital, assets or other resources of the firm through various means. On top of these requirements, the Chinese Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises, ASBE 36, 9 prescribes requirements concerning related-party relationships and transactions disclosures.
Theory of the Regulatory Environment
In this study, the regulatory environment of changing corporate disclosure requirements is tested. We seek to determine whether the introduction of mandatory 9 ASBE 36 ‗Disclosure of Related Party Relationships and Transactions' was issued by the Ministry of Finance with an operative date from 1 January 1997. disclosure regulations in relation to corporate financial reporting has inhibited or enhanced voluntary information disclosure. It is widely thought that an efficiently operating unregulated stock market offers enough incentives for businesses to voluntarily disclose information. When various incentives and market realities have the effect of forcing management to disclose information to markets, then voluntary corporate disclosures should produce adequate information for investors and other corporate stakeholders (Jovanovic, 1982) . A wide range of relevant literature suggests strongly that voluntary disclosures are influenced by changes in mandatory disclosure requirements (Gonedes, 1980; Verrecchia, 1982; Dye, 1985 Dye, , 1986 There are two opposite arguments regarding the impact of the regulatory environment on corporate disclosure. The first argument advocates that voluntary disclosures may decline as the mandatory reporting requirements become more detailed (Gonedes, 1980; Verrecchia, 1982; Dye, 1985; Nagarajan and Sridhar, 1996) . The second argument suggests that the mandatory disclosure of nonproprietary information provides incentives for the voluntary disclosure of correlated proprietary information. This is because the increase in the mandatory disclosure of non-proprietary information reduces the benefits of withholding correlated proprietary information (Dye, 1986; Taylor and Redpath, 2000) . Dye (1990) investigates a comparison between mandatory and voluntary disclosures in a simple market economy where disclosures by one firm can alter the perceptions about the distribution of other firms' cash flows as ‗financial externalities' and possibly the actual distributions of other firms' cash flows as ‗real externalities'. He further argues that any divergence between voluntary and mandatory disclosures is dependent upon which kinds of externalities a firm's disclosures generate. Externalities generated by increased mandatory disclosure requirements reflect that competitors are faced with the same expectation to disclose proprietary information.
Testing the Effects of Changes in Corporate Disclosure Requirements
To establish investor confidence in the stock market and to achieve better investment decisions, it is contended that corporate provision of information needs to be regulated so as to allow external stakeholders, particularly minority shareholders, to enjoy a certain minimum level of disclosure of both proprietary and non-proprietary information. Managers of a firm are assumed to have more information regarding the firm's present and future performance than outsiders have, and such information is not necessarily easily or freely attainable by all the firm's stakeholders, even if they have legitimate interests in the business' activities. The public cannot rely on information disclosed by managers as it could be inaccurate, unstable or even misleading. Thus, accounting and other corporate information needs to be regulated in the public interest. By regulating accounting and other corporate information, the public, who are at an information disadvantage, can be protected from an inefficient market and unregulated information disclosure.
In accordance with the basic principles of The Company Law, The Securities Law and other relevant laws and regulations, as well as with commonly accepted standards in international corporate governance, The Code was issued in China in January 2002. It was formulated to promote the establishment and improvement of the modern enterprise system, to standardise the operations of listed firms, and to bring forward the healthy development of the securities market in China (Lin, 2004) .
The aspect of the regulatory setting which is of concern in this study is whether the introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements relating to corporate financial reporting inhibits or enhances management's incentives to voluntarily disclose additional information. The literature on the voluntary disclosure strategy of firms indicates that voluntary disclosures are influenced by changes in mandatory disclosure requirements (Dye, 1986 Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004) . The hypothesis that is tested in this study is largely based on the arguments presented in first three of these studies. Dye (1986) suggests that mandatory and voluntary information disclosures are complementary when mandatory disclosures consist of reporting a firm's non-proprietary information. He argues that an increase in mandatory disclosure of non-proprietary information will reduce the benefits of withholding correlated proprietary information. The effect is an increase in incentives to voluntarily disclose such correlated proprietary information. To test Dye's 1986 model, Taylor and Redpath (2000) investigate the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosures of financial instruments for a sample of Australian mining companies during 1996 and 1998. They discover that an increase in mandatory disclosure is paralleled by an increase in voluntary disclosure. Chalmers (2001) examines the derivative instrument disclosure practices of Australian companies during the period of voluntary disclosure between 1992 to 1997, and also in the year of 1998 the standard on financial instrument presentation and disclosure became mandatory in Australia. She concludes that there was a significant increase in voluntarily disclosure after the introduction of the standard. Thus, the hypothesis that we seek to test in this paper is: Hypothesis: There will happen significant increases in the voluntary disclosure of related-party relationships and transactions after the introduction of The Code in China in 2002.
Methodology

Sampling
This study focuses on non financial A-share 10 firms listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In order to test the effects of various types of ownership on disclosure-that is, high levels of state and foreign investor ownershipthe sample of companies is divided into three groups: A-share, AB-share, 11 and AH-share 12 companies. A sample of 120 companies was selected from the listed companies in China's Shanghai SSE180 13 and Shenzhen SSE100 14 indexes for the period 2001-2005. This was achieved by using a stratified random sampling method. As is shown in Figure 1 , from the overlapping area for AB-shares, 42 companies were randomly selected from the AB-share group. Only 32 companies were listed on both the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and one of the two mainland Chinese stock exchanges (see the overlapping area for AH-shares). Therefore, all these AH-share companies were selected for our sample. Finally, 46 companies were randomly selected from the A-share group. 10 A-shares are common stock issued by mainland China firms, subscribed and traded in RMB, listed on the mainland stock exchanges, and are reserved for trading by Chinese citizens. The A-share market was launched in 1990 in Shanghai. 11 B-shares are issued by mainland China firms, traded in foreign currencies, and listed on the mainland stock exchanges. The B-share market was launched in 1992 and was restricted to foreign investors before 19 February 2001. AB-share companies are those that have issued both Ashares and B-shares, with an initial A-share offering. 12 H-shares are securities of companies incorporated in mainland China and nominated by the Chinese Government for listing and trading on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, being quoted and traded in HKD. There are no restrictions on holdings by international investors. AH-share companies are those that have issued both A-shares and H-shares, and have floated their shares simultaneously on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and one of China's two mainland stock exchanges. 13 Shanghai SSE180 Index was created by restructuring and renaming the SSE30 Index. Through scientific and objective methods it selects constituents that best represent the market. The SSE is a benchmark index reflecting the Shanghai market and serves as a performance benchmark for investment and a basis for financial innovation. 14 The Shenzhen SSE100 is a benchmark index reflecting performance in the Shenzhen market and serves as a performance benchmark for investment and as a basis for development of financial innovations. 
Content Analysis
Content analysis is the major method used in collecting the data for this study. The sources for the content analysis were 545 annual reports of the 118 sampled companies for the period 2001-2005. The disclosure of information can be quantified in three steps. First, all items disclosed in the annual report of a firm that accord to the disclosure categories of ABSE 36 is extracted. Second, to overcome the disadvantage of manifest content in content analysis, a blending of manifest and latent analysis strategies 15 15 Royse (2008) suggests that the greatest disadvantage in using content analysis is the manifest content, which means that the manifest content is directly related to the methodology of counting individual words, expressions or events, and thus is comparable to what is seen on the surface of a message unlike latent content which refers to the deep structural meaning (Berg, 2004) . In this study, a blending of manifest and latent analysis strategies is used to overcome the disadvantage of content analysis, and is perhaps the best solution to solve this issue.
is used in this study. Third, the number of words for each item of disclosure is counted. The first step in measuring the quantity of comprehensive disclosure involves the segregation of items relevant to related parties. According to ABSE 36, related-party disclosure can be divided into two categories, with three items to be disclosed under each category, as displayed in Table 2 . Regarding the definition of related parties, Article 4 of ABSE 36 states that if a party has the power to directly or indirectly control, jointly control or exercise significant influence over the financial and operating policy decisions of another party, those parties are regarded as related parties; and if two or more parties are subject to control from the same party, they are also regarded as related parties.
The related-party relationships dealt with by Article 5 of ABSE 36 principally refer to:
 Enterprises that directly or indirectly control, or are controlled by, the reporting enterprises; and two or more enterprises subject to control from the same enterprise (such as parent companies, subsidiaries and fellow subsidiaries);  Joint ventures;  Associated enterprises;  Principal individual investors, key management personnel, or the close family members of such individuals;  Other enterprises directly controlled by principal individual investors, or key management personnel, or the close family members of such individuals.
According to Article 6 of ABSE 36, related parties do not including the following:
 Providers of finance, public utilities, government departments and agencies that only have normal dealings with an enterprise, although they may participate in the financial and operating policy decisions of the enterprise, or circumscribe the freedom of action of the enterprise to a certain extent;  A single customer, supplier or agent with whom an enterprise transacts a significant volume of business by virtue only of the resulting economic dependence.
In dealing with related-party transactions, Article 8 of ABSE 36 defines a related-party transaction as ‗an event whereby a transfer of resources or obligations takes place between related parties, regardless of whether a price is charged.' The standard also provides examples of related-party transactions such as:
 Purchases or sales of trading goods or of assets other than trading goods;
 Rendering or receiving of services;  Agency arrangements;  Leasing arrangements;  Provision of finance (including loans or equity contribution, made in cash or in kind);  Guarantees and collaterals;  Management contracts;  Transfer of research and development;  License agreements;  Emoluments for key management personnel As shown in Figure 2 , the disclosure of relevant items of related-party relationships and transactions stems from separate sections (i.e., the subsection ‗Related-Party Relationships and Transactions' under the section ‗Notes to Financial Statements', and the subsection ‗Substantial Related Transactions in Reporting Period of the Company'), and nondedicated sections (i.e., the section ‗Report of Board Directors') in a company's annual report.
Figure 2. Map for Disclosure of Related-Party Relationships and Transactions in Annual Reports
The second step in measuring the quantity of comprehensive disclosure involves using a blending of manifest and latent content analysis strategies. One of the arguments concerning the use of content analysis is whether the analysis should be limited to manifest content (those elements that are physically present and countable) or extended to more latent content. In the latter case, the analysis is extended to an interpretive reading of the symbolism underlying the physical data (Berg, 2004) . As mentioned earlier, Berg (2004) suggests that the best solution to the dilemma about whether to use manifest or latent content is to use both whenever possible. In this case, a given unit of content would receive the same attention from both methods. For example, the key words ‗related party', ‗related-party relationships' or ‗related-party transactions' may appear in the section ‗Notes to Financial Statements' by mandatory requirement or in the section ‗Substantial Events' voluntarily, but may appear only in the section ‗Report of Board of Directors' by using words such as ‗subsidiaries', ‗son company', ‗parent company', etc. All these words will be counted as disclosures for related-party relationships and transactions. To avoid double counting, if identical or close meanings in disclosure appear in both the sections ‗Substantial Events' and ‗Report of Board Directors', only one occurrence of disclosure would be counted. The last step is to count the number of words to be disclosed as the unit of analysis. Content analysis requires the selection of a unit of analysis (Guthrie et al., 2004) . Holsti (1969, p.116 ) defines a recording unit as -the specific segment of content that is characterised by placing it into a given category‖. In the accounting literature, Gray et al. (1995)  Page count (Guthrie and Parker, 1989) In this study, to measure the extent of disclosure relevant to related-party relationships and transactions within annual reports, the number of words relating to specified disclosure items is selected as the unit of measurement. We follow the approach suggested by Brown and Deegan (1998) , and sum the words, and numbers that are counted as equivalent to a number of words, as our measure the extent of disclosure. Table 3 presents a comparison of means by year for the disclosure items. A one-way ANOVA test analyses the variances between the years over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The analysis can provide a test of our null hypothesis that each group (year) sample is drawn from the same underlying probability distribution against the alternative hypothesis that the underlying probability distributions are not the same for all group samples. Table 3 indicates that there are no significant increases in the means of all disclosure items, including overall disclosures for related-party relationships. The F-statistics are small. The expected large jump in mandatory disclosure items of relatedparty relationships between 2001 and 2002, the years pre-and post-introduction of The Code, is not found. However, for the overall mandatory disclosure items regarding related-party transactions, Table 3 shows that there is a significant increase in the mean for overall disclosure over the period 2001¬2005, with a large F-statistic of 4.4752 and a small p-value of 0.0014. As expected, the greatest jump of 13. Table 3 also indicate that there is a significant increase in the mean for the comprehensiveness of disclosure for related-party relationships and transactions (RPDISC), with a large F-statistic of 10.3301 and a p-value of zero. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected. It is concluded that the underlying probability distributions of means are not the same for all group samples (i.e., years) over the five-year period from [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Table 4 presents a comparison of means by share-type over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The results indicate that there were significant increases in the means of all disclosure items, including overall disclosure for related-party relationships. Furthermore, as expected, the average overall disclosures for related-party relationships for AB-and AH-shares are greater than the disclosure for A-shares. For the disclosure items of related-party transactions, Table 4 shows that there is a significant increase in the mean for overall disclosure, with an F-statistic of 3.0527 and a small p-value of 0.0480. In fact, all items in this category show a significant increase over the three types of share except for the item on the amounts of outstanding items, or the appropriate proportions. For voluntary disclosure, there is a significant increase in the mean across the three types of share, as indicated by a large F-statistic of 28.5691 and a pvalue of zero. The results also show that there is a significant increase in the mean for the comprehensiveness of disclosures for related-party relationships and transactions (RPDISC), as revealed by a large F-statistic of 14.8128 and a p-value of zero. Therefore, according to the F-statistics in this oneway ANOVA analysis, the null hypothesis is rejected. It is concluded that the underlying probability distributions of means are not the same for all group samples across A-, AB-and AH-shares. 
Result and Discussion
Descriptive Analysis
Univariate Analysis
Univariate analysis refers to the analysis of one variable at a time. An independent two-sample t-test is used to test the hypothesis that there are significant differences in the voluntary disclosure of related-party relationships and transactions before and after the introduction of The Code in 2002. This t-statistic can provide a test of the null hypothesis that the means of two normally distributed populations are equal against the alternative hypothesis that these means are not equal. Because of the character of unbalanced panel data, the independent two-sample t-test assuming unequal sample sizes and unequal variances is the most appropriate choice.
In testing the hypothesis, which predicts a significant increase in the voluntary disclosures of related-party over the period 2001-2005, a comparison is made in Table 5 between the means of the disclosure items for the pre-and post-regulation years with the means of the same items for the same period. In relation to disclosure of related-party relationships, the results indicate that there are statistically significant increases in the means for all disclosure items including overall disclosure for related-party relationships, as c t t  | | or p < 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected. In relation to disclosure of related-party transactions, Table 5 shows statistically significant increases in the means for all disclosure items for the periods pre-and postintroduction of The Code, except the item on pricing policies, including those transactions where no amount or only nominal amounts have been charged ( | | t < 1.9782, p > 0.05). But the overall disclosure for related-party transactions has increased, and is statistically significant. Thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected. Accordingly, we are confident that our results support the notion that the introduction of mandatory disclosure rules with respect to certain types of corporate information has the effect of not only providing more information of this type to shareholders and to those who are nor related in some way to the firm's management, but also there appears to take place at the same time a greater willingness to voluntarily provide other kinds of information, all of which will provide the underpinnings of a better informed and therefore more efficient stock market.
